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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is threefold. First, to describe the Italian reform in electricity
markets, comparing the models of liberalization and privatization followed by the Italian legislator
with the British and French experiences. Second, to analyze the structure of the Italian electricity
industry, which arose from the reform, and to study its effects in terms of increased competition
from the vertical separation of the former monopolist. For this reason the traditional definition
of market power will be revised. New indicators of the existence of a dominant position will be
described. Studying the peculiarities of this industry, it will be proven that market power depends
on the firm capacity to modify the short-run marginal costs and to withhold some of its generation
capacity. Third, to analyze how this notion of market power is subject to continuous change and
to take into account the evolution of the electricity industry towards a multi-utility structure in a
multinational context.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Essay is threefold:
* To describe the Italian reform in electricity markets, com-
paring the models of liberalization and privatization fol-
lowed by the Italian legislator with the British and French
experiences.
" To analyze the structure of the Italian electricity industry,
which arose from the reform, and to study its effects in
terms of increased competition from the vertical separation
of the former monopolist. For this reason the traditional
definition of market power will be revised. New indicators
of the existence of a dominant position will be described.
Studying the peculiarities of this industry, it will be proven
that market power depends on the firm capacity to modify
the short-run marginal costs and to withhold some of its
generation capacity.
" To analyze how this notion of market power is subject to
continuous change and to take into account the evolution
of the electricity industry towards a multi-utility structure in
a multinational context.
Italian and European Commission merger cases will be ana-
lyzed to understand the importance of this "new" definition of
market power. Moreover, since the'degree of competition de-
pends on the ability to limit market power, this definition will
also be relevant to assess the effect of the electricity reform. So-
lutions to enhance competition in the industry will also be ex-
plored.
* AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. This Essay results from the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute Twenty-eighth Annual Conference in International
Antitrust Law and Policy, Oct. 25-26, 2001.
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I. THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
A. Description of the Italian Reform
Italy is radically changing the role of the public sector in all
network utilities-public utilities that require a fixed network to
deliver their services, such as electricity, gas, water, rail, and
fixed link telephony.'
Until the 1990s, the State was directly involved in produc-
tion and distribution of all public utilities. Public utilities were
organized in a monopolistic way and the State granted conces-
sions and subventions. Price regulation was not based on a ra-
tional policy: some prices were very low for social objectives
(e.g., water and transport), while others were high, especially for
electricity and telecommunications. The monopolistic structure,
soft budget constraints, and absence of actual and potential com-
petition, generated a low level of efficiency and problems for the
public deficit.
The organizational structure of many public utilities has
been changing over the past decade, following the principles of
liberalization, de-integration, and market contestability dictated
by the European Commission in many Directives. Many State
1. David M. Newbery, Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities,
MIT PREss (2000). Network utilities are economically of high importance since the
networks of these utilities are classic natural monopolies; they create rents that are
fought over. The networks are durable and fixed, so the rents persist. The capital of
the network is large and sunk, so, once created, the balance of bargaining advantage
shifts from investor to consumer. Finally the networks of electricity, gas, water, and
telecoms are directly linked to the consumer, giving their owner potentially large ex-
ploitative power. The problem facing investors and consumers is to devise an institu-
tion that will balance these interests and this power. The tension between the investor
and consumer can be side-stepped by State-ownership, which has the coercive power to
finance the sunk capital, without requiring the assurance of a future return from the
utility. Alternatively, it can attempt to reconcile private ownership with consumers' po-
litical power through regulation.
Economists since Adam Smith have argued that competition provides incentives
for firms to minimize production costs and to restrain prices. This theory fails for natu-
ral monopolies. They either face no effective competition and hence are under little
pressure to cut costs or keep prices low or, if competitors enter, wastefully duplicate
facilities, raising costs and prices. Either way, the market will fail to satisfy consumer
needs at a low cost. The conventional analysis of network utilities starts from this mar-
ket failure, which justifies regulation or public ownership to restrain prices and restric-
tion on entry to avoid costly duplication. The task is to devise rules for setting prices
and meeting demand that encourage efficiency and to favour the development of com-
petition through a vertical separation between markets in natural monopoly (i.e., the
transmission grid in the electricity industry) and markets potentially contestable (i.e.,
generation and supply of electricity).
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bodies have separated from government and have transformed
into companies partially or fully privatized.
The Italian electricity sector is one of the most important
"productive and distributive spheres" experiencing a profound
transformation. Italy began to reform from a position of very
little competition. Until 1991, the electricity sector was a public
legal monopoly, with a vertically integrated structure, meaning
all electricity activities were reserved to Ente Nazionale Energia
Elettrica ("ENEL") through a sole concession. In that year, gen-
eration was opened to cogeneration and generators using renew-
able energy, which had to sell their output to ENEL at regulated
premium prices. In addition, auto generators were allowed to
sell electricity directly to ENEL. ENEL's considerable influence
in approving entrants served as a limit to this market structure.
In fact, until Legislative Decree n.79 of March 16, 1999,2 imple-
menting EC Directive 96/92,' was enacted, only a marginal num-
ber of generators (in terms of power capacity) were allowed to
enter the market and sell electricity.
Legislative Decree 79/99 represents a milestone of reform
in the Italian electricity sector. It introduces competition in: (i)
generation, (ii) supply to liberalized customers and a new regu-
latory mechanism for non-contestable markets, (iii) supply to
captive customers (small customers who are not eligible to par-
ticipate in the free market), and (iv) transmission (i.e., the natu-
ral monopoly market characterized by the essential facility na-
ture of the grid).
More precisely, the main points of the Decree 79/99 are:
1. It gradually opens the supply market to competition for
liberalized customers (i.e., mainly industrial customers, ei-
ther singly or grouped in consortia,4 who are now free to
choose their own supplier and to participate in the future
wholesale market).
2. Legislative Decree n.79 of March 16, 1999 (Italy).
3. Council Directive 96/92/EC, O.J. L 027, 0020-0029 (1997).
4. Legislative Decree Concerning the Implementation of Directive 96/92/EC, art.
14 (Italy). At present, all final customers and consortia with a minimum annual con-
sumption of 20 GWh/per year are eligible. This corresponds to about 35% of total
Italian demand. From January 1, 2002 the new threshold is fixed at 9 GWh/per year,
liberalizing about 40% of the electricity demand in Italy. Moreover, according to the
budget law for 2001, 90 days after the disposal of the first generating company by
ENEL, the threshold for final customers will be lowered to 0.1 GWh/per year, corre-
sponding to a market opening of about 70%.
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2. It creates a new company, ENEL Distribuzione Spa, with
the goal to manage the local transmission grid and to sup-
ply electricity to captive customers.
3. It grants concessions for local distribution to the incum-
bents5 by the Minister of Industry until December 31,
2030, allowing for only one concession on the territory of
each municipality and providing that distribution access
tariffs are regulated by the Energy Authority ("Autoritd per
l'energia elettrica e il gas").
4. It establishes a public company, the Single Buyer, to en-
sure electricity supply to all captive customers. This Single
Buyer will express the captive demand in the future whole-
sale market.
5. It charges a public company established in 1999, Gestore
della Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale, an independent sys-
tem operator ("ISO"), with the management and dispatch
of the national transmission system. Moreover, it estab-
lishes that network access can be refused only on the basis
of lack of capacity and, for imports, where reciprocity con-
ditions are not met.
6. It requires the Transmission System Operator to establish
a company, Gestore del mercato elettrico, responsible for
organizing and managing the electricity wholesale market.
The market is expected to become active in 2002.
7. It introduces a limit on generation and import by any sin-
gle company to fifty percent of the total electricity pow-
ered and imported in Italy, from January 1, 2003 (this is
the deadline for the divestiture of 15.000 MW by ENEL
through three companies called Gencos).
In summary, the aim of the Italian reform is to favor the
development of competition through a vertical separation of the
historical operator, ENEL, to remove barriers to entry into pro-
duction and distribution, and to establish a new market to keep
in balance supply and demand between independent generators
and eligible customers. It creates new independent institutions
of regulation to control the access to the transmission grid (Ges-
tore della rete and the Energy Authority), to guarantee the sup-
ply to captive customers (the Single Buyer), and to organize the
future wholesale market (Gestore del mercato).
The object to separate generation, transmission, and distri-
5. ENEL Distribuzione is the most important local distributor and supplier of elec-
tricity to captive customers. In fact, it covered 92% of the captive demand in 2000.
20021
950 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:946
bution is to offer guarantees of transparent and fair access to the
grid and to avoid discrimination and cross-subsidization between
consumers with different demands (eligible and captive custom-
ers). The vertical separation has been realized with the estab-
lishment of different subsidiaries. At present, the ex-monopolist
is active in generation, through ENEL Produzione and ERGA, in
transmission, through TERNA, in distribution to captive custom-
ers, through ENEL Distribuzione, and in supply to liberalized
customers, through ENEL Trade. Since the national grid is an
essential facility, the management of the network has been trans-
ferred to a new independent company, in such a way as to avoid
the risk of abuse of a dominant position by the historical opera-
tor.
The choice to realize only a structural and budgetary sepa-
ration in the vertical integrated activities of the historical mo-
nopolist is not the best solution and presents many limits, which
could be eliminated with a much more radical reform: owner-
ship separation. Actually, the existence of a unique integrated
group, although separated in different companies, does not as-
sure the necessary transparency for the development of a real
contestable industry.
The idea to create a totally unbundled industry, in which
every single activity is under different owners and in which no
company in any one segment owns assets in any other, is the
most efficient but not the most common. The critical element
of vertical separation is to ensure that the link between genera-
tion and transmission is severed so that generators do not own
transmission and the transmission company does not own gener-
ation.
Regulation and antitrust activities are simplified if genera-
tion and distribution are also separated, because then the
boundary between the natural monopoly and potentially com-
petitive parts is clearly defined.
Between European countries it is possible to identify two ex-
treme modalities to reform the electricity industry: the British
model and the French model. Italy followed an intermediate so-
lution. Although the European Directive 96/92 dictates some
basic principles, it leaves each country the power to decide mo-
dalities and timing to transform the electricity industry in a
group of contestable markets. For this reason the European
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electricity industry is characterized by a heterogeneous market
structure. The need to harmonize the organization and regula-
tion of all national electricity industries is one of the main aims
in the context of European integration. To understand the im-
portance of these objectives it is useful to point out the peculiari-
ties of the electricity reforms in Britain and France-the two ex-
treme models of liberalization and privatization in the electricity
industry.
B. A Comparison with the British and French Experiences
The English model of vertical separation represents a model
for reform in developed countries.6 In summary, the British re-
form restructured the State-owned electricity industry separating
generation from transmission, allocating generation capacity be-
tween different companies, and creating a spot market for
wholesale electricity to make generation competitive. The limit
of this radical reform was the existence of only two companies
with plants whose output could be varied and who could there-
fore set the price. Each one could, by raising the prices of the
marginal plant, increase the revenue earned by all of its in-
framarginal plants and hence have an incentive to distort its
bids.
The consequences became clear a few years later. In the
first three years, the two fossil generators set the pool price
ninety percent of the time and raised pool prices even though
fuel costs were falling. The final straw came with the sharp in-
crease in pool prices in April 1993. Faced with the alternative of
a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for
abuse of market power, the generators agreed to a price-cap on
pool prices for the two financial years 1994-95 and 1995-96 and
to divest 6,000 MW of plants. In this way, the regulator increased
competition from entrants and significant decreases in genera-
6. The United Kingdom started with an industry which was under public owner-
ship from 1948 to 1990, and for most of this period the Central Electricity Generating
Board operated all generation and transmission as a vertically integrated statutory mo-
nopoly, with 12 area boards acting as regional distribution monopolies. The Electricity
Act 1989 divided the Central Electricity Generating Board of England and Wales into
four companies. These companies were created as public limited companies and sold,
together with the National Grid Company to the public in December 1990. Moreover,
the aim of the British reform was the development of a single market where supply
meets demand, and that operates as a daily, day-ahead, sealed bid auction.
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tion prices are now observed. The British experience is of great
importance both to understand what "market power" means in
the electricity industry and to analyze the role of regulatory and
antitrust authorities in this reformed market.
Unlike the aims of the European promoters of Directive 96/
92 and of the British reformers, the objectives of the French au-
thorities were not to favor the development of the competition
per se, but to respect the directive a minima.7 The starting situa-
tion in France is the public service model in the form of the
national utility, an integrated public enterprise Electricit6 de
France ("EDF"), which is supposed to supply electricity on the
basis of the egalitarian principles of public service and to be the
instrument of the industrial and energy policies.
In summary, the French reform did not destabilize the inte-
7. The aim of the French legislator in the directive transcription was to find a
difficult equilibrium between opposing principles:
(i) to accept the regulations relating to competition but also to maintain the
capacity for State action in matters of energy policy;
(ii) to preserve the legitimacy of the sectorial integration inside the public
electricity enterprise but also to guarantee fairness in competition, by the
transparent rules of access and the presence of an autonomous regulator.
The implicit aim of this reform is to make contestable the French power
market and to place the incumbent under the threat of entries without
dispersion of production assets or the creation of regional or major local
distributors.
In order to meet these different and opposite objectives, the French reform is char-
acterized by the following principal traits:
(i) it removes the legal barriers to entry into production with a simple proce-
dure of authorisation and sales to eligible consumers, without imposing
divestitures of plant to the incumbent;
(ii) it aims to separate transmission, operation, and dispatching from the his-
torical operator's other activities in order to offer guarantees of transpar-
ent and fair access to the grid, but without organic separation through the
creation of a subsidiary;
(iii) it creates an independent institution of regulation, with powers of con-
trol aimed at limiting abuse of the dominant position; and
(iv) it grants liberalized customers the power to choose the supplier (but the
threshold for eligibility is very high).
Therefore, contrary to several other European power reforms (for example, the
British and Italian reforms), the law allows restricted access to the network for French
consumers by defining the threshold of their eligibility at the lowest level laid down by
the Directive without the possibility of sites aggregation or consumers grouping. Unlike
other European countries, the 190 local distributors are only partly eligible, their free-
dom of purchase of electricity being limited to the quantities taken by eligible consum-
ers in their zone. Moreover, the historical incumbent is already vertically integrated
and no divestiture in generation plants has been imposed to induce entry into the mar-
ket.
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grated electricity market structure. This preservation of vertical
and horizontal integration confers upon the historical operator
a number of advantages in competition, which also constitute
endogenous barriers for potential entrants. First of all, EDF
held about ninety percent of production capacity in 1999, most
of it at low variable cost (hydro and nuclear), which means that
it had a considerable capacity to respond to the threat of compe-
tition and to keep its market share. The decision not to impose
a divestment in generation, in such a way to induce entry by
other national and foreign producers, has preserved the domi-
nant position of the historical monopolist.
In addition, the vertical integration structure allows the in-
cumbent to influence the price for connection, in other words,
to submit the competitors to the discretionary valuations made
by the historical operator. Moreover, the Electricity Law con-
tains significant restrictions, which further limit the margin of
maneuver of the independent electricity generators for the sup-
ply of eligible customers.8
The French experience and the large number of merger
cases, which involve the historical monopolist, prove that, for a
market to be contestable, one must not only remove the legal
barriers to entry, but define its structure in such a way that the
incumbent and the entrants all compete under terms that are
symmetric. Regulatory and antitrust authorities must ensure
that the incumbent does not abuse and benefit from advantages
that allow it to dissuade entry and to reduce potential competi-
tion.
The asymmetry in structures and regulations between Euro-
pean countries, which is evident in comparing the British reform
with the French reform, has created a significant level of incon-
sistency between Member States, with the risk that anticompeti-
tive behaviors in one State generate legal, political, and eco-
nomic disputes referring to the reciprocity principle at the Euro-
pean level.
The necessity of harmonizing the organization of all na-
8. See e.g., Electricity Law, ch. IV, art. 22 (Fr.); see also Decree No. 20001069 of
October 30, 2000 (Fr.) (providing that authorized electricity generators can only
purchase electricity for resale to eligible customers for an amount of 20% of their re-
spective installed generation capacity). This significantly restricts the ability of the inde-
pendent electricity generators to play a more active role in the market for supply of
liberalized consumers.
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tional electricity industries is becoming more and more evident
given the large number of mega-mergers which involve States
with different regulatory and market structures.
In this heterogeneous environment, Italy has made great
strides in redesigning the regulatory regime and the structure of
its electricity sector following the principles of competition and
de-integration. The Italian legislators followed the model of the
British reform and, contrary to the French experience, the re-
form in Italy went well beyond the minimum specified in the
European Union Electricity Directive. Actually, within the Euro-
pean Union only the United Kingdom has acted more positively
to create a structure of generation with the intent of promoting
competition.
However, even after the realization of the major objectives
of the reform, precisely after the divestitures imposed on the his-
torical operator ENEL, the electricity industry in Italy retains va-
rious restrictions on competition.
More precisely, the analysis of the Italian electricity industry
indicates that further divestiture is needed for effective competi-
tion to be likely and that the limit for generation and import by
any single company (fixed to fifty percent) is potentially dissua-
sive and insufficient to induce efficiency choices by the incum-
bent and to stimulate new entry. In addition, ownership of
transmission assets and the bulk of generation have not been
separated out in Italy; separate owners would be necessary to en-
sure efficient maintenance, development, or operation of the
grid. Moreover, the long-term fix for local distribution conces-
sions (December 31, 2030) implies a "stable" natural monopoly
structure with the consequence of assuring to each local incum-
bent (ENEL in the large part of the territory) a non-contestable
dominant position. Reducing the duration for these concessions
would be useful to introduce competition for the market and to
harmonize the local electricity distribution market with the dura-
tion for other public utilities,' such as gas.
To understand the effects of the Italian reform and the fur-
ther steps in the regulatory regime to open the electricity indus-
try to competition, it is necessary to analyze:
1. The four markets in which it is possible to decompose the
vertically related stages of production and distribution of
the electricity industry;
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2. The notion of market power taking into account the key
differences between electricity and other primary com-
modities;
3. The evolution of this notion as a consequence of the estab-
lishment of multiutility and multinational firms; and
4. The role of regulatory and antitrust authorities in this re-
formed industry.
II. THE FOUR ELECTRICITY MARKETS THAT COMPOSE THE
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: THE ITALIAN SCENARIO
The activities of the electricity industry can be divided into
four different markets or physical stages: generation, transmis-
sion, distribution, and supply. Generation is the production of
electricity in power stations. The geographical dimension of this
market can be defined nationally since the existence of import
barriers, particularly the low capacity in the interconnection be-
tween national and foreign grids, do not allow a constant flow of
electricity.
In this market, ENEL is already the dominant operator in
Italy, with a market share of about fifty to fifty-five percent and a
gross capacity of about 40.000 MW.9 This data takes into ac-
count the divestment of 15.000 MW of capacity that ENEL must
realize before 2002 to comply with Article 8 of the Legislative
Decree n.79/99. After this divestiture, three new companies will
compete in the market: Eurogen, Elettrogen (Gencos), and In-
terpower, with a market share of nine to ten percent, eight to
nine percent, and three to four percent, respectively, in terms of
production. Other competitors are Italenergia (Edison-
Sondel), with a market share of about seven to eight percent,
and municipalities with a total share of four percent.
Even if the market share is not the most important and cor-
rect indicator of market power, it is a first proxy of the capacity
to operate independently from the other generators. In fact,
under European Union competition law, a company with a mar-
ket share above forty percent would usually be considered domi-
nant and its actions subject to special scrutiny to ensure its domi-
nance is not abused. Despite the reform, ENEL remains the
leader in generation since its high capacity (five times higher
9. Italian Competition Authority Bulletin, n.8/2001 (case C4438-ENEL-France
Telecom/New Wind) (containing all data reported).
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than the second operator) prevents contestability and allows fix-
ing prices without competitive pressure.
Transmission means the transport of electricity over high-
tension cables. Since the transmission grid is unique and since
there is no competition with other foreign networks, the geo-
graphical dimension is national.
ENEL already has the ownership of this network even if the
management has been transferred to an independent company,
the Gestore della rete. This last operator should guarantee ac-
cess with no discriminatory tariff, so that all generators can use
the essential facility grid and compete with ENEL to supply elec-
tricity to final consumers. Of course, the existence of an inde-
pendent operator that manages the grid is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to open the supply market. It is necessary
because without an independent company, ENEL could control
access into the market. It is not sufficient because ENEL already
has the ownership of the grid, which means it has the power to
acquire relevant information about electricity flow and to deter-
mine investment plans.
Distribution means the transport of electricity over the low-
tension local cables. ENEL operates in this market through
ENEL Distribuzione, a subsidiary that has the ownership of the
local cables and manages the supply to captive consumers. Even
if there are numerous companies in this market, in particular
municipalities, ENEL is the dominant firm with a share of about
ninety percent in terms of supply to captive customers; the sec-
ond operator's market share is not above two percent. This is a
relevant market since the supply to captive consumers represents
seventy-four percent of the total demand of electricity in Italy in
2000. Taking into account that companies in this market oper-
ate until 2030 on the basis of concessions by the Ministry of In-
dustry, the dominant position of ENEL is stable and incontesta-
ble in the short term.
Delivery to liberalized customers is the market of all con-
sumers that are declared eligible, so they are free to choose their
own suppliers of electricity. This market was created by EC Di-
rective 96/92 and, in Italy, by the Legislative Decree n.79/99. In
fact, this decree allows private customers and consortia, with
consumption above a specified threshold, to sign bilateral con-
tracts with generators. Following the same arguments used for
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generation, this geographic market is national. Although some
electricity can be exchanged between Italy and other neighbor-
ing countries, the equipment permitting these exchanges is of
limited capacity.
At present, the supply of energy to liberalized customers is a
highly concentrated and asymmetric market. ENEL is the first
operator, in terms of electricity supplied. In fact, in 2000 ENEL
covered about forty to fifty percent 0 of the liberalized energy
demand (it supplies about 20-25 Twh), while the second most
important operator was Edison, with a market share of about
twenty to twenty-five percent.11
For the future, the aim of the reform is to increase the de-
gree of competition in the supply to eligible customers through
the organization of a wholesale market. According to Article 5
of the Legislative Decree n.79/99, a wholesale market should be
active starting from 2002. In this market, generation owners
send bids to the system administrator (Gestore del Mercato) for
each unit they own. These bids represent the prices at which
owners are willing to sell power from specific units for a speci-
fied time period, usually the next twenty-four hours. The system
administrator dispatches units in order of the lowest to highest
bid as needed to meet demand for all participants (liberalized
customers) on a continuous basis. The bid price of the last unit
dispatched during any given hour sets the market clearing price
for that hour. All units dispatched during that hour receive the
same market-clearing price regardless of the unit bid price.
The aim of the reform is to establish a perfectly competitive
market in which generation owners bid their production costs
(or short-run marginal costs); however, this implies the existence
of numerous suppliers, that is the absence of one or few opera-
tors with the power to fix the clearing price. This means that
generation must have a competitive structure with a low concen-
tration degree and symmetric, not vertically integrated opera-
tors.
In other words, creating a competitive supply market re-
quires that nobody has the capacity to exercise market power in
10. See SECURITY EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT (Italy) (specifying that
that ENEL trade accounted for approximately 47% of the sales to free market).
11. Id. (specifying that this data takes into account the effect of the acquisition of
Montedison by Italenergia).
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generation, otherwise the dominant position in production im-
plies a dominant position in fixing prices in the liberalized sup-
ply market. The result is the neutralization of efficiency and so-
cial benefits that are expected from competition.
In summary, since the effect of competition in the supply
market to eligible customers is strictly linked with the degree of
competition in generation, and since competition in generation
depends on the peculiarities that characterize electricity, the
analysis requires a move from a simple static index (e.g., the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) to a new dynamic market power
indicator. Studying this indicator of market power in the elec-
tricity markets is relevant both from a competitive point of view
(e.g., an antitrust authority which has to decide to oppose or not
to oppose a notified merger) and from a regulatory point of view
(e.g., a regulatory agency which has to fix access tariffs or to im-
pose a price cap mechanism).
III. THE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND MARKET POWER
A. Market Power Indicators: The Limit of Market Share Analysis
and the Necessity to Estimate the Capacity to Fix the
Marginal Price
In order to understand how and when regulatory and anti-
trust authorities have to intervene in the electricity industry, the
first step is to revise the traditional definition of market power in
such a way to take into account the peculiarities of electricity.
The starting point in analyzing the market power in the
electricity industry is to take into account the key feature of the
electricity: producers and consumers must be physically linked,
with changes in supply and demand propagated through the en-
tire network at the speed of light. In fact, since electricity cannot
be stored, supply and demand must be kept in balance second
by second. Gas is similar in that pipelines must link producers
and consumers, but its physical flow is relatively slow-it can be
stored within the pipe or at storage sites, and its flow through
each link separately controlled. Electricity, in contrast, chooses
a path through the network following a specific physical law,
whereby any change in demand or supply at any node immedi-
ately affects the pattern of flows through all links in the network.
This means that changes in supply by any producer or demand
by any consumer create external effects on all others connected
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to the network, and these externalities threaten the efficiency of
decentralized markets.
In addition, each link in the network has a maximum rated
capacity for carrying current, so the flows into each node have to
be controlled and may have to be constrained to prevent these
transmission limits being exceeded. Moreover, the quality of
electricity (frequency, voltage, phase angle) must all be main-
tained within tight limits. It is therefore important to balance
supply and demand and to match them as closely as possible at
the standard voltage and frequency to avoid power fluctuations
in consumers' appliances.
These characteristics of electricity imply the necessity to
pass from a static traditional market power indicator to a dy-
namic one. In fact, although the degree of market concentra-
tion (e.g., market shares or the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index)
gives an estimation of the firm capacity to follow independent
behaviors, the ability to exercise market power in electricity mar-
kets (generation and delivery) depends on much more than
market concentration. More precisely, market power depends
on the firm's capacity to modify the short-run marginal costs of
generation in almost every hour of the day and to withhold some
of its capacity. In other words, to define the market power, it is
necessary to analyze the firm's ability to fix the market-clearing
price of electricity significantly higher than "perfectly competi-
tive" prices. Actually, the important points to note about the fu-
ture wholesale markets are the bid-based dispatch of generating
units, and the payment rule whereby all units dispatched in each
time interval receive the market clearing price, which is set by
the bid price of the marginal unit required to meet demand in
each time interval.
Thus, to valuate the market power in generation (conse-
quently in delivery) it is of primary importance to analyze the
structure of plants in terms of production costs and the capacity
to meet demand during peak hours. Plants can be classified on
the base of the marginal production cost in three different
groups: base load (low marginal production costs and high
fixed costs), mid-merit, and pick load (high marginal produc-
tion costs and low fixed costs). Since it is the last unit supplied
which fixes the price for all infra-marginal units, the share of
pick load plants owned, that is, the capacity to meet demand in
each hour without necessitating a continuous flow of generation,
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is a relevant indicator of the existence of a dominant position.
On the contrary, using traditional indicators, such as market
shares, creates the risk of underestimating the real market
power. A firm can dispose of all plants necessary to meet de-
mand in peak hours, thus the power to fix the clearing price,
and nevertheless the system can be within the range considered
only moderately concentrated. In other words, in an industry
with fluctuating demand, with a potentially constrained transmis-
sion link, and with a product that cannot be stored, the market
power depends on the ability to generate electricity in such a way
to satisfy peak demand and to control the price strategy for the
last units supplied. To measure this market power, a proxy is the
reserve capacity that is the excess production with respect to
peak demand.12 Of course, this capacity must be analyzed taking
into account the quality of the plant, for example, the percent-
age of mid-merit and peak load plants owned by each operator.
The Italian Competition Authority followed this approach
in the merger case EAEL/Infostrada.13 The Authority's investiga-
tion showed that the acquisition of a telecommunication com-
pany, Infostrada, would have increased the ex-monopolist's dom-
inant position in delivery to liberalized customers. In fact, ENEL
would have increased the number of its eligible customers for
electricity through the supply of a bundle of goods (telecommu-
nication services and electricity), that is, through its change into
a multi-utility enterprise. Moreover, competitors would have
had no chance to follow the same strategy given ENEL's domi-
nant position in generation.
To prove the existence of a dominant position in genera-
tion, the Authority pointed out that the ex-monopolist, ENEL,
owned the sixty percent (42.000 MW 4) of the total gross genera-
12. A more complex indicator is the Supply Function Equilibrium, that is the aver-
age difference between the instantaneous market clearing price and the production
cost. Economists, such as R. Gree & D. Newbery [1992], A. Rudkevich, M. Duckworth &
R. Rosen [1998], define the "market clearing price" as the Nash Equilibrium solution.
The formula for the market clearing price of electricity resulting from Nash Equilib-
rium based bidding strategies is a function of the particular electric system's production
cost curva, the instantaneous demand of electricity, the maximum anticipated demand
in the overall period for which bids are submitted and the number of generating firms
bidding into the wholesale market.
13. Italian Competition Authority Bulletin, n.8/2001.
14. This data takes into account the divestiture of 15.000 MW through the three
Genco.
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tion capacity in Italy, with a reserve capacity, that is an excess
generation capacity with respect to peak demand, of 15.000 MW.
Given this gross capacity in generation, ENEL was the only firm
able to meet the demand during peak hours, i.e., for forty-eight
percent of the time.
Moreover, ENEL gained ownership of a big share of peak
load and mid-merit plants. As a result, ENEL had control of
those plants that supply the marginal unit of electricity, which
means the power to fix price in generation. More precisely,
ENEL had a generation capacity composed of sixty-five to eighty-
five percent pick load and mid-merit plants.
In summary, the Authority utilized not only the static data
represented by the market share (i.e., the fact that ENEL pro-
vided electricity for about fifty percent of the total liberalized
demand in 2000), but also dynamic indicators (i.e., the gross ca-
pacity, the excess capacity with respect to total demand and the
power to control the marginal unit price through the ownership
of a large number of pick load and mid-merit plants). The use
of simple static data would underestimate the real market power
since even a lower market share would be compatible with the
dominant position in generation. In fact, the ex-monopolist
could have a market share lower than fifty percent but its excess
capacity in generation and the structure of its plants would al-
ways guarantee the power to fix prices higher than marginal
costs, independently from consumers and potential competitors.
For these reasons it is possible to argue that the existence of
a limit for generation and import by any single company (the
Legislative Decree 79/99 fixed a threshold of fifty percent) is
useless since it is not a real indicator of market power. On the
contrary, this static threshold can reduce the incentive for im-
provement and can produce inefficiency in generation.
Of course, the market power in generation has a relevant
effect in terms of market power in delivery, more precisely in
delivery to liberalized customers. In fact, if a company can fix
the wholesale price, that is the price in generation, it has the
power to control the basic variable in the computation of the
retail price. In other words, without competition in generation
it is impossible to have a competitive market in delivery.
As clearly pointed out in the merger case, ENEL/Infostrada
as the dominant operator in generation, was also considered the
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company with market power in delivery to the liberalized mar-
ket. More precisely, ENEL had a share of about fifty percent in
delivery to eligible customers in 2000, while its most aggressive
competitor, Edison, had less than the half of this percentage.
On the basis of these figures the Authority concluded that ENEL
was in a dominant position both in generation and in delivery.
This link between generation and delivery has become one of
the more controversial points in the analysis of regulatory re-
forms and in evaluation of mergers in the electricity industry.
From a regulatory point of view, this link implies that open-
ing the supply market without removing restraints in generation
is a useless reform with no effects in terms of efficiency and con-
sumers' benefits (lower prices and higher quality). From the
point of view of a competition authority, the link between gener-
ation and delivery implies the need to analyze the effect of an
acquisition or to evaluate potential anticompetitive behaviors
that take into account the market power in both markets.
B. The Evolution of the Market Power Definition in a Multi-Utility
and Multinational Electricity Industry
The above definition of market power in the electricity in-
dustry-the capacity to control prices while keeping in balance
supply and demand second by second, forcing up the market
clearing price, and withholding some of the capacity-is a no-
tion which must be improved with regard to the evolution of the
electricity industry. The Italian Competition Authority im-
proved this notion taking into account the effect of the establish-
ment of a multiutility firm, namely a firm that supplies a range of
public services such as electricity, gas, telecommunications,
water, etc. In the merger case ENEL/Infostrada, the Authority an-
alyzed the effect of the acquisition of a telecommunication com-
pany, Infostrada, by ENEL, the dominant operator in both gen-
eration and delivery to eligible customers. The Authority
pointed out that this merger would have increased the market
power of ENEL in delivery to liberalized customers through the
supply of bundle of goods/services.
With the acquisition of. Infostrada, ENEL would have in-
creased the number of its potential clients for electricity. In fact,
a share of about twenty-five to forty-five percent of customers,
who are not liberalized customers at the moment, will be sup-
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plied by ENEL for both electricity and telecommunications in
the near future when the reduction in the threshold will trans-
form them into liberalized customers. The Authority main-
tained that the existence of supply contracts for telecommunica-
tion services between Infostrada and these shares of captive cus-
tomers (that is, not liberalized consumers) would have facilitated
the establishment of long-term contracts between ENEL and
these future eligible customers for the supply of electricity.
ENEL would have internalized the economies coming from this
increase of potential customers for electricity; consequently it
would have reinforced its dominant position in delivery.
Actually, the supply of bundle of goods/services to a large
number of eligible customers would have produced economies
of scale (i.e., lower cost in measuring consumption, in issuing
unique bills, etc.) and economy of scope (i.e., the trade-mark
effect in terms of customer satisfaction) with the effect of in-
creasing the ex-monopolist's ability to use an aggressive price
strategy with respect to competitors and potential entrants.
Moreover, its dominant position in generation would have guar-
anteed the power to fix prices in the future wholesale market.
So, competitors in delivery would have been subject to the price
strategy of ENEL in generation.
To sum up, given the ex-monopolist's dominant position
both in generation and delivery to liberalized customers, and the
capacity to "transform" eligible consumers to captive clients
through the supply of bundles of goods/services, ENEL would
have had the power: (i) to act with aggressive strategies in deliv-
ery to eligible clients, fixing the retail price above the wholesale
price but below the competitors' level (thanks to the economies
generated by the multiutility strategy); and (ii) to oblige compet-
itors to fix prices below generation price (that is the cost to buy
electricity in the wholesale market) in order to induce their exit
from delivery to liberalized consumers.
In order to solve the competition problems raised by this
acquisition, the Italian Competition Authority approved the op-
eration subject to full compliance with the commitment to divest
at least 5.500 MW of generation 'capacity owned by ENEL. More-
over, given the importance of the cost structure in generation,
the Authority specified that sixty percent of the divested capacity
should be composed of mid-merit and peak load plants, that is
plants with the power to meet the fluctuating demand second by
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second and to fix the clearing price. This decision made clear
the need to take advantage of the reform opportunity and go
further with respect to creating a structure that promotes com-
petition, especially in generation. In fact, although the Legisla-
tive Decree 79/99 imposed a threshold of fifty percent on total
capacity, this was not sufficient to develop competition in gener-
ation and, consequently in supplying to eligible customers. As
explained above, the real indicator of market power is not only
the market share but the capacity to control the clearing price,
which implies the capacity to keep in balance supply and de-
mand second by second through peak load and mid-merit
plants. So, a lower market share can guarantee the market
power in generation, and consequently the capacity to influence
the price strategy of competitors in delivery to liberalized con-
sumers.
Together with divestitures in generation, another measure
to increase competition is the divestiture of transmission from
generation. Actually, even if the reform de-verticalized the elec-
tricity industry, ENEL has the ownership of the transmission
grid. This structure does not provide strong economic incen-
tives for the ex-monopolist to act in a way to increase competi-
tion. For example, the incumbent has no incentives to realize
investments in the transmission capacity so as to open the "geo-
graphic market" to large import flows from foreign firms.
The definition of the relevant geographic market is the sec-
ond dimension, together with the relevant product market,
which must be analyzed taking into account the evolution of the
electricity industry and the effects due to national reforms. The
necessity of giving a correct definition of the geographic market
in the electricity industry has become more and more relevant in
the last few years, given the great number of concentrations in-
volving national and foreign companies. Currently, both the
Commission of the European Communities and the Italian Com-
petition Authority, consider generation and supply as national
markets due to the regulatory restrictions and the technical con-
straints that characterize the electricity industry. In fact, in all
European Countries no significant imports of electricity can take
place. Imports are constrained by the limited character of inter-
connector capacity. For example, the interconnector capacity
between France and its neighboring countries amounts to ap-
proximately 20 to 25 GW. Compared with the installed genera-
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tion capacity in France of about 110 GW, the import capacity is
less than ten percent. In Italy, the interconnector capacity is not
higher than in France and imports amounted to approximately
fifteen percent of total production in 2000.
Regulatory restrictions are another reason for this geo-
graphic definition. In particular, the existence of relevant asym-
metry in implementing EC Directive 96/92 determines a hetero-
geneous context with some States characterized by a fully liberal-
ized electricity market, for example UK, and others with an
integrated and dominant incumbent, for example France. This
asymmetry can become a critical point when the Commission or
a Competition Authority has to evaluate mergers that can reduce
competition, that is, increase the incumbent's market power, in
a national geographic market involving neighboring foreign
companies.
The Commission merger case EDF/EnBW5 gives a clear rep-
resentation of the need to define the market power taking into
account the geographic peculiarities of the parties involved. As
a result of this concentration, EnBW (a vertically integrated elec-
tricity utility which is active in all fields of supply and transport of
electricity in the Southwest of Germany) would have become a
joint venture controlled by EDF (the dominant incumbent in
France) and OEW (an association of nine public districts in Ger-
many).
The Commission pointed out that the proposed concentra-
tion would have strengthened EDF's dominant position on the
market for eligible customers in France since it would have elim-
inated EnBW as a potential competitor on the French market
and it would have increased EDF's retaliation potential in Ger-
many.
More precisely, the Commission observed that, although the
French reform tried to open the electricity markets, EDF could
significantly influence the price for electricity supply to eligible
consumers. Moreover, as an integrated monopoly company, it
was able to respond to competition challenges in the market for
liberalized customers by moving margins from these consumers
to the sector of captive customers (those which cannot freely
choose their supplier). On the other hand, EnBW was one of
the major electricity suppliers at an interconnected level in Ger-
15. Commission Decision, Case No. M.1853 (Feb. 7, 2001).
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many with a long common border with France, and with EDF's
supply area. Consequently, EnBW could have supplied a signifi-
cant share of consumption by French liberalized customers and
the merger would have eliminated one of the more aggressive
competitors.
Moreover, given the asymmetry in regulation and in the re-
form process, the Commission argued that the concentration
would have increased EDF's potential for retaliation in Ger-
many. In fact, given the asymmetry in the electricity reforms be-
tween France and Germany, EDF enjoys a very strong position in
the market for supply to eligible customers in France, but it is
"protected" from foreign competition. The acquisition of EnBW
would have granted EDF the possibility of being active on the
fully liberalized German market via an existing highly aggressive
competitor, whilst EDF's position in its home market was still
well protected due to its very strong position in the French mar-
ket in terms of capacity and secured non-eligible customers.
Given these competition concerns, the concentration was de-
clared compatible with the common market subject to full com-
pliance with some commitments. In particular, EDF undertook
to make available to competitors access to in total 6,000 MW gen-
eration capacities located in France.
This merger case highlights the importance of considering
the asymmetry in regulation between geographic markets to give
a correct definition of market power. Actually, this asymmetry
can not only guarantee the incumbent's dominant position in its
own market but also influence the potential restrictions in com-
petition due to the acquisition of companies operating on for-
eign markets. This is the case with EDF/EnBWmerger case: the
acquisition of a German company by the dominant firm in
France would have reinforced the market power of this last com-
pany in its home-France market given the asymmetric regula-
tions and the transmission constraints between these two coun-
tries.
Of course, the reverse is not always true. Actually, the domi-
nant position in a geographic market does not guarantee the
capacity to exercise market power in another geographic area
dominated by a national incumbent. This is the case of the ac-
quisition by the Fiat Group, through Italenergia, of sole control
of Italy's energy company Montedison and subsidiaries Edison
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and Sondel. 6 The Commission's investigation has shown that
the takeover will not adversely affect competition in the Italian
electricity market since Montedison will be controlled by Fiat
and the latter has only a small activity in the electricity sector.
However, in the event that EDF, at the moment a minority share-
holder, will acquire joint control in Montedison, the Commis-
sion will have to examine the case again, given the risk that its
market power in the French home market could restrict compe-
tition in the Italian market.
Without any intention to anticipate the future, in the event
of a hypothetical merger evaluation of two considerations are
possible:
1) The need to take into account the existence of geographic
constraints, in terms of limited transmission capacity, to
define the market power, and to make forecasts about the
extension of this market power from the domestic to for-
eign markets; and
2) The necessity of harmonizing the regulation and the or-
ganization of all national electricity industries given the
above restraint in the evaluation of mergers involving na-
tional and foreign operators.
In fact, only removing the barriers to exchanges of electricity be-
tween countries, both from a regulator and a technical point of
view, for example reducing the incumbent privileges and in-
creasing transmission capacity, will make it possible to integrate
the national electricity markets and analyze the market power in
a new perspective. Without this harmonization and without in-
vestment to improve the transmission grids there will always be
the risk of confusion between the consequence of the political
disputes referring to the reciprocity principle at the European
level and the economic restrictions connected with those con-
centrations involving national and foreign companies, which af-
fected only the national relevant markets given the geographic
dimension of the electricity industry.
IV. REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN THE ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO LEARN
FROM THE RECENT EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA
The recent electricity crisis in California provides some use-
16. Fiat/Italenergia/Montedison, Case No. COMP/M.2532 (Aug. 28, 2001).
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ful hints to complete the analysis of the electricity regulatory re-
forms in European countries. The collapse of California's elec-
tricity restructuring and competition program has attracted at-
tention around the world. Prices in California's competitive
wholesale electricity market increased by 500% between the sec-
ond half of 1999 and the second half of 2000. For the first four
months of 2001, wholesale prices were ten times what they were
in 1998 and 1999.
While wholesale prices rose dramatically, retail prices were
fixed until early in 2001. As a result, California's two largest utili-
ties, Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison, were
paying far more for wholesale power than they were able to re-
sell it for at retail. The bankruptcy was inevitable and the State
of California had: (i) to use state funds to buy power from un-
regulated wholesale suppliers; and (ii) to modify the electricity
reform in such a way to avoid widespread blackouts.
A discussion of lessons about electricity market liberaliza-
tion gained from California's experience is useful in order to
avoid similar problems in other countries, such as Italy, where
the electricity reform is taking its first steps. To understand the
reason for this electricity crisis it is necessary to summarize Cali-
fornia's restructuring program. For nearly a century, Califor-
nia's electricity industry was organized around three regulated
private vertically integrated monopolies. The California Public
Utilities Commission, an independent state regulatory agency,
heavily regulated their prices, costs, and service obligations.
This industry was reformed in 1996.
The reform was built around a new industry structure in
which the production of wholesale electricity from existing gen-
erating plants and the entry of new plants would be deregulated,
and their power sold in a new competitive wholesale market. Re-
tail consumers would have the power to choose a competitive
electricity service provider, using the transmission and distribu-
tion wires of their local utility to obtain "direct access" to these
new competitive wholesale markets or to continue to receive
power from their local utility at prices determined by the regula-
tory agency. This means that the utilities were forced to sell
their generating plants, in order to facilitate the creation of a
truly competitive wholesale market with several additional inde-
pendent suppliers, but they also retained the obligation to buy
power in the new wholesale market for retail consumers who did
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not choose a competitive retail supplier and to resell it to them
at a fixed price regardless of its cost for up to four years.
This reform did not to take into account the definition of
"market power" in the electricity market and this was the big mis-
take. The reform did not consider that while during low de-
mand periods the energy markets appear to be quite competi-
tive, when demand gets very high the clearing price is far above
the marginal cost. In fact, since there is virtually no real demand
elasticity in these markets, it is evident that as demand grows and
supply gets tight, generators realize that a small amount of ca-
pacity withholding, even with moderate levels of concentration,
can lead to large wholesale price increases. The combination of
inelastic demand and tight supplies creates opportunities for in-
dividual suppliers to exercise market power. In this context,
maintaining fixed retail price with deregulated and increasing
wholesale price implies: (i) the utilities bankruptcy; or (ii) wide-
spread blackouts.17
CONCLUSION
This recent experience in California's electricity industry
highlights the risk of following a reform model that liberalizes
some markets (generation) but regulates others with fixed prices
(supply to eligible customers). This kind of reform creates a dis-
torted mechanism during high demand periods since indepen-
dent service providers cannot compete with the fixed utility re-
tail price and have incentives to return the customers with whom
they have contracts to the utility default service so that they can
increase profits by selling their power in the wholesale market.
In other words, given the rigidity in demand for electricity, gen-
17. During May 2000 these market power problems and associated strategic behav-
ior by suppliers became more and more severe as the wholesale electricity prices began
to rise above historical peak levels and above the fixed price that utilities were permit-
ted to charge for retail service.
Since retail consumers did not pay prices that responded to movements in whole-
sale market prices, they had no incentive to reduce demand and independent service
providers (independent generators) could increase profits by selling their power to util-
, ities in the wholesale market at increasing prices. For these reasons, by September
2000, utilities were paying nearly three times as much for power in the wholesale mar-
ket than they could charge at retail and began to confront serious cash flow problems.
California government officials responded to the emerging crises only in early
2001, increasing the retail fixed price by about 40%, speeding up the permitting of new
power plants, and negotiating long-term contracts with generators.
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erators can sell in the wholesale market at increasing price and
transfer to the utilities the cost of these behaviors. Of course,
the result is the bankruptcy of these utilities and the necessity of
State intervention with high social costs.
To avoid similar problems it is clear that the liberalization
and regulation process in the electricity industry must have the
following characteristics:
1) Generation has to be a real competitive market, which re-
quires (i) a reduction in the incumbent's market power
through divestitures in plants and (ii) easy procedures to
enter into the market;
2) All markets have to be free from regulatory restrictions in
terms of price caps or price fixing, since a liberalized
wholesale market with a regulated retail market implies
dissuasive behaviors during high demand periods and
risks of bankruptcy for utilities;
3) The number of eligible customers has to be increased (re-
ducing the threshold of consumption necessary to be-
come eligible customers until a complete liberalization of
the supply market);
4) Eligible customers have to be induced to buy electricity
from the market, limiting the possibility of staying captive
and buying at fixed price; and
5) Fixed prices for captive customers must be regulated tak-
ing into account the evolution of the wholesale market
and the important signals about reduction in reserve mar-
gins coming from this market.
The lesson from the recent crisis in California gives impor-
tant insight into how to avoid the occurrence of similar
problems in the Italian electricity reform. First of all, the need
to create a competitive and open generation market is evident.
This implies that the power plants should not be concentrated in
the hands of few generators, in particular the historical incum-
bent. Secondly, the threshold to become eligible customers has
to be reduced in such a way to increase the demand and the
wholesale market dimension.
Finally, investments in the transmission grid have to be real-
ized so as to increase imports from foreign countries and the
number of competitive suppliers in the wholesale market. For
the same reason, the ownership of the grid should be trans-
ferred to a public company not controlled by the ex-monopolist.
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In summary, regulatory reforms in Italy as in all other coun-
tries must guarantee a market structure in the electricity industry
that does not encourage market power. This structure would
also reduce the risk of abuse by incumbent operators and would
guarantee a clear scenario for Competition Authority's investiga-
tions.
